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Abstract
This paper extends Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde￿ s (1986) seminal work on tax
compliance to the real-world scenario where the IRS (Internal Revenue Service) faces a
budget constraint imposed upon her by the Congress. The paper consists of two parts.
The ￿rst part is positive ￿we characterize the equilibria resulting from the interaction
between taxpayers and the budget-constrained IRS. The second part is normative ￿
we examine the e¢ ciency implication of varying the size of the budget allocated to the
IRS. It is shown that, to mitigate or eliminate the so-called ￿congestion e⁄ect,￿the
IRS should be su¢ ciently budgeted and, in particular, we provide a case for the policy
prescription that the size of the budget allocated to the IRS should be expanded as
￿Corresponding author, C.C. Yang. Mailing address: Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Nankang,
Taipei 115, Taiwan. Email: ccyang@econ.sinica.edu.tw
1long as an additional dollar allocated could return more than an additional dollar of tax
revenue.
1 Introduction
￿Unlike other government agencies, there is a positive return on money invested
in the IRS. ... In its FY2007 budget recommendation, the Board calls for a modest
increase in enforcement that would result in a real return on investment, ranging
from three to six dollars on every dollar spent, resulting in $730 million revenue
increase by FY2009 on a $242 million investment.￿
IRS Oversight Board (2006, pp. 12-13)1
On the basis of a 3-1 to 6-1 return for an additional dollar invested, does it make sense
for the Board to recommend an expanded IRS budget on enforcement? This paper provides
a case for the positive answer.
We consider a model of tax compliance, which extends the seminal work of Graetz, Rein-
ganum and Wilde (1986, hereafter GRW) to the real-world scenario where the IRS faces a
budget constraint imposed upon her by the Congress. The paper consists of two parts. The
￿rst part is positive. We characterize the equilibria resulting from the interaction between
taxpayers and the budget-constrained IRS, and study the impact of imposing budget con-
straints on the IRS. The second part is normative. We examine the e¢ ciency implication
of varying the size of the budget allocated to the IRS and, in particular, we ask: how much
should we fund the IRS?
Unlike the classical work of Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974) on tax
evasion, which treats the IRS actions as exogenous, the GRW model views the IRS as a
1￿The IRS Oversight Board was created by the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA 98),
which was enacted to improve the IRS so that it may better serve the public and meet the needs of taxpayers.￿
(see the web-site of the Board)
2strategic player that interacts with taxpayers. The GRW model also di⁄ers from the principal-
agent tax evasion model ￿rst introduced by Reinganum and Wilde (1985). As pointed out by
GRW, the principal-agent model su⁄ers from the time inconsistency problem since it requires
that the IRS announce and commit to an audit policy, even though the precommitted audit
policy will typically prove suboptimal once taxpayers submit their reported income. GRW
emphasize that their interactive model follows the natural temporal sequence of decisions:
￿rst, taxpayers report their income, and only then does the IRS decide whether to perform
tax audits.2
Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde (1984, hereafter GRW0) also extend the GRW model to
account for the e⁄ect of imposing budget constraints on the IRS. However, their way of
deriving equilibria is somewhat complicated. We believe our approach greatly simpli￿es the
analysis. More importantly, we further address the e¢ ciency issue across equilibria whereas
they do not. We will compare our approach with the GRW0 approach after we derive the
equilibria of our model.3
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) investigate the same normative question as our paper. The
main di⁄erences in modeling include: (i) while they study tax auditing with commitment, we
study tax auditing without commitment; and (ii) while they subsume the IRS and the Congress
under the rubric of a single player called ￿government,￿we treat the IRS and the Congress
as two di⁄erent players. Perhaps more interestingly, the policy prescription derived from
our model starkly contrasts that derived from their model. Slemrod and Yitzhaki prescribe
2For recent surveys of the tax evasion literature, see Andreoni et al (1998), Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002),
Cowell (2004) and Sandmo (2005). Auditing is typically a negative-sum game between taxpayers and the
IRS. However, using auditing as a threat, it may be feasible for the IRS to create a Pareto-improving outcome
for both taxpayers and the IRS under some circumstances; see Chu (1990) and Ueng and Yang (2000, 2001)
for the details.
3Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo (1997) consider the e⁄ect of imposing budget constraints on the IRS
in a principal-agent framework. They do not address the e¢ ciency issue either.
3that the size of the budget allocated to the IRS should not be expanded to the level where an
additional dollar allocated would return just an additional dollar of tax revenue.4 By contrast,
we prescribe that the size of the budget allocated to the IRS should be expanded until an
additional dollar allocated would return just an additional dollar of tax revenue. It is shown
within our model that our policy prescription always dominates other policy prescriptions
that fall short of equating the marginal revenue to the marginal cost of tax collection. The
dominating criterion is based on the lower e¢ ciency cost per dollar of tax collection. We will
make more comparisons between our result and theirs when we address the e¢ ciency issue.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic model.
Section 3 provides the full characterization of the equilibrium outcomes. Section 4 addresses
the e¢ ciency issue and provides an answer to the optimal funding of the IRS. Section 5
considers an extension of the basic model and Section 6 concludes.
2 Basic Model
Our basic model is essentially the same as the GRW model. For ease of exposition, however,
we transform the GRW model into an equivalent, but simpler, model. GRW assume that
taxpayers earn either high or low income. High-income taxpayers need to pay a high tax,
while low-income taxpayers need to pay a low tax. We normalize the low income of the GRW
model to zero so that either taxpayers earn an income or they do not. Only the taxpayers
who earn the income need to pay tax in our model. GRW defend their simple setup by
arguing that ￿the model might also be viewed as addressing issues of noncompliance across a
4This conclusion is also drawn by Usher (1986), Kaplow (1990), Mayshar (1991), and Sanchez and Sobel
(1993). A feature of the Slemrod-Yitzhaki model that these papers have in common is the auditing with
commitment. Except for the principal-agent model of Sanchez and Sobel (1993), these papers, similar to
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987), subsume the IRS and the Congress under the rubric of a single player called
￿government.￿
4relatively small range of income￿ for example, within a given audit class￿(GRW, p. 17). We
consider an extended model with multiple audit classes in Section 5.
Suppose that there is a unit mass of continuum taxpayers who may earn an income y > 0.
This income need not be the total income earned. It may simply represent a particular type
of income, say, income from vehicle sales or tip income. Those taxpayers who have income y
are obliged to pay a positive tax T (< y), while those who do not have y are obliged to pay
nothing. The IRS knows that there is a q 2 (0;1) portion of taxpayers who have y, and a
1 ￿ q portion of taxpayers who do not have y. However, the IRS cannot identify a priori
which taxpayer has y and which taxpayer does not have y. As emphasized by GRW, one of
the distinct features of modern systems of income taxation is their self-reporting nature: the
tax law requires taxpayers to ￿le tax returns and report their own income to the IRS. The
taxpayers who do not have y will always report nothing to the IRS truthfully. However, some
taxpayers who have y may cheat and also report nothing. A cheater is subject to a ￿ne F > 0
if he is discovered cheating by the IRS. This ￿ne is imposed in addition to the tax T due with
T +F ￿ y (the limited liability constraint). The taxpayers who have y are assumed to possess
a common von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function over income, namely, u :R+ !R+ with
u0 > 0 and u00 < 0. They maximize the expected utility by choosing to report y or report
nothing.5
After receiving a taxpayer￿ s report, the IRS can decide whether to perform an investigative
tax audit. Auditing is costly and the IRS has to bear a cost of c > 0 to verify each taxpayer.
We assume as in GRW that the truth will be discovered once a tax audit is performed and
5There are the so-called ￿ghost￿taxpayers, who fail to ￿le their tax returns to the IRS as required by the
tax law (Cowell and Gordon, 1995; Erard and Ho, 2001). In our simple model, those taxpayers who have y
but report nothing to the IRS and those taxpayers who have y but do not report it to the IRS can be treated
as the same. Thus, there are two possible interpretations for non-compliance in our model: (i) underreporting
if taxpayers have y but report nothing to the IRS, and (ii) non-￿ling if taxpayers have y but fail to ￿le tax
returns with the IRS.
5that it always pays o⁄ for the IRS to audit an evader (i.e. T + F > c). Under a given
budget constraint I, the IRS￿ s objective is to maximize the tax revenue collected (including
taxes and ￿nes), net of audit costs through auditing. Because auditing is costly, it is clear
that the ￿pro￿t-maximizing￿IRS will only audit those taxpayers who report nothing. We
assume that none of the taxpayers bear any additional cost during the auditing process. We
also assume that the IRS cannot use the taxes or ￿nes collected to ￿nance her own auditing
expenses.6 The IRS takes the tax T , the ￿ne F and the budget I as given in her auditing
since these variables are predetermined by the Congress. Our focus is on the impact of I.7
The timing of this game is as follows. Given the realization of y ;c;T;F and I, those
taxpayers who do not have y always report nothing, and those taxpayers who have y simul-
taneously choose whether to report y or not. After observing the taxpayers￿reports, the
IRS randomly chooses to audit a fraction of taxpayers who do not report y. We solve the
equilibrium of this game under the condition that the IRS￿ s strategies are restricted to depend
on the distribution of the taxpayers￿reports only.8
3 Equilibrium
3.1 Equilibrium outcomes
In this subsection we will characterize all the equilibrium outcomes of the game.
6Wertz (1979, p. 144) describes the rule of the game: ￿An agency [the IRS] may not spend more on
enforcement activities in a budget period than its legislature has appropriated for them. De￿ciencies collected
throughout the period are transmitted to the general government; they may not be used by the agency to
expand its activities.￿
7Both the tax T and the ￿ne F are also under the control of the Congress. However, their determination
is not on the yearly basis as the budget I.
8This restriction implies that a unilateral deviation by a single taxpayer cannot in￿ uence the course of our
game. It is a natural regularity requirement when there are many players; see, for example, Gul et al (1986).
63.1.1 Characterization
We use the notation ￿ to denote the portion of cheaters among all taxpayers,9 and the notation
￿(￿) to denote the IRS￿ s best audit response to ￿. It is clear that ￿ 2 [0;q] and ￿ (￿) 2 [0;1].
Note that the IRS can observe ￿ in our model. This is because the IRS knows by assumption
that there is a q 2 (0;1) portion of taxpayers who have y, but only a q￿￿ portion of taxpayers
report having y to the IRS.




￿ + (1 ￿ q)
(T + F)
where ￿ + (1 ￿ q) is the portion of taxpayers who do not report y. R(￿) represents the
marginal revenue of tax collection to the IRS when there is the ￿ amount of cheaters. Observe
that R(0) = 0; R(q) = q (T + F), and @R
@￿ > 0.
To characterize the equilibrium, we need to de￿ne several other notations. First, de￿ne
￿ ￿ as the probability of audit such that a taxpayer who has income y is merely indi⁄erent
between reporting y and not reporting y. That is,
￿ ￿u(y ￿ T ￿ F) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿
￿
u(y) = u(y ￿ T):
Secondly, de￿ne ￿ ￿ as the amount of ￿ such that the IRS is merely indi⁄erent between auditing
and not auditing. That is,
R(￿ ￿) = c: (1)
Finally, de￿ne ^ ￿ as the amount of ￿ such that the IRS uses ￿ ￿ as the audit probability and
9Thus, the portion of honest taxpayers (including those who have y and also report y to the IRS, and those
who do not have y) equals (q ￿ ￿) + (1 ￿ q) = 1 ￿ ￿. Note that the notation ￿ in the GRW model denotes
the portion of actual cheaters among those who are potential cheaters, while it denotes the portion of cheaters
among all taxpayers in our model. That is, our ￿ equals GRW￿ s q￿.
7just exhausts all her budget. That is,
￿ ￿(^ ￿ + 1 ￿ q)c = I:
For convenience, we shall call ￿the taxpayer who has y￿simply ￿the taxpayer￿from now on.
We use (￿￿;￿￿) to denote the outcome of an equilibrium. Let ￿ be the set of all equilibrium
outcomes. The following proposition characterizes the set of equilibrium outcomes of the
game.10
Proposition 1 (i) If R(q) 2 [0;c), then ￿ = f(q;0)g.
(ii) If R(q) = c, then ￿ = f(q;￿) : ￿ 2 [0;minfI
c; ￿ ￿g]g.
(iii) If R(q) > c, then
a) ￿ = f(q; I
c)g for I 2 [0; ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q)c);
b) ￿ = f(￿ ￿; ￿ ￿);
￿







g for I 2 [ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q)c; ￿ ￿c];
c) ￿ = f(￿ ￿; ￿ ￿)g for I 2 (￿ ￿c, 1).
Remark 1 In b) of Proposition 1 (iii),
￿
^ ￿; ￿ ￿
￿
will coincide with (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) if I = ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q)c,





if I = ￿ ￿c. This can be seen directly from the de￿nition of ^ ￿.
Remark 2 Taxpayers report their income to the IRS before auditing and, therefore, they are
￿rst movers in the auditing game. However, unlike the leader in a Stackelberg game, knowing
the IRS￿ s response ￿(￿) does not help the taxpayers much because no taxpayer can alter ￿ by
his single deviation and hence no taxpayer can a⁄ect ￿ by his income report (remember our
regularity assumption that the IRS￿ s strategies only depend on the distribution of the taxpayers￿
reports). As a result of this ￿impotent￿feature, the taxpayers de facto take the IRS￿ s audit
probability ￿ as given. This explains why the subgame perfect equilibrium coincides with the
Nash equilibrium in our model. This coincidence is consistent with Kalai￿ s (2004) observation
that the equilibria of simultaneous-move games are robust to a large variety of extensive or
sequential modi￿cations when there are many players.
10The proofs of our propositions are all relegated to the Appendix.
83.1.2 Hard-to-tax
There are the so-called ￿hard-to-tax￿taxpayers, which is a common referrence to small ￿rms,
smaller farmers, self-employed persons, and informal suppliers.11 These taxpayers could be
de￿ned as those whose ￿tax amounts are quite low compared with the administration costs
that would have to be incurred by the tax administration to assess the proper amount of
tax.￿(Thuronyi, 2004, p. 102). This de￿nition corresponds to the case where R(q) 2 [0;c]
in our model. ￿Hard-to-tax￿is not the same as ￿impossible-to-tax￿after all. It is simply
not pro￿table for the IRS to audit these taxpayers. As a result of lacking the motivation to
audit, a very high level of evasion results in equilibrium (￿￿ = q in Proposition 1 (i) and (ii)).
The possibility that the corner solution ￿￿ = q will occur when audit costs are very high
has been noted by GRW. Our minor addition is to point out that if the equilibrium outcome
￿￿ = q is associated with R(q) 2 [0;c], then pouring more resources into tax administration
will be of little help in resolving the problem and ￿￿ = q will still result. Bird and Casanegra
de Jantscher (1992) emphasize that a common constraint usually faced by tax reforms in
developing countries is the scarcity of resources for tax administration. This emphasis may
need to be quali￿ed in light of our ￿nding here.12
3.1.3 Graphic illustration
The intuition underlying Proposition 1 (iii) is best understood in terms of the best-response
graphs of the taxpayers and of the IRS. Figures 1a, 1b and 1c illustrate a), b) and c) of
11Informal suppliers are de￿ned as: ￿individuals who provide products or services through informal arrange-
ments which frequently involve cash-related transactions or ￿ o⁄ the books￿accounting practice.￿ (Internal
Revenue Service, 1996, p. 43)
12Former IRS Commissioner Lawrence B. Gibbs was reported to have stated that the IRS will not collect
￿small amounts owed by such a huge number of taxpayers that collection e⁄orts would not be cost-e⁄ective￿
(Los Angeles Times, 1987). Inspired by Gibbs￿statement, Reinganum and Wilde (1988) consider a model in
which the IRS will tolerate evasion in cases where collection e⁄orts would not be cost-e⁄ective for the IRS.
9Proposition 1 (iii), respectively. In each ￿gure, the dotted curve represents the taxpayers￿
best response while the solid curve represents the IRS￿ s. Note that taxpayers adopt pure
rather than mixed strategies in our model. In drawing the dotted curve, it is assumed
that there exists a representative taxpayer who will choose evasion with a probability of ￿
q
and compliance with a probability of
q￿￿
q . Our pure-strategy outcome is realized through
the representative taxpayer￿ s in￿nite trials so that, due to the law of large numbers, the ￿
amount of taxpayers will evade while the q ￿ ￿ amount of taxpayers will comply.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Note that the shape of the taxpayers￿best-response curve remains the same as that in
GRW. Note also that the shape of the IRS￿ s best-response curve remains the same as that in
GRW if ￿ < ￿ ￿. However, the shape of the IRS￿ s best-response curve changes if ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿: Two
salient features stand out. First, the result ￿(￿) 2 [0;1] would be true at ￿ = ￿ ￿ if there were
no budget constraint. This is because ￿ ￿ is by de￿nition the amount of ￿ such that the IRS
is indi⁄erent between auditing (￿ = 1) and not auditing (￿ = 0). However, when the budget
constraint is imposed, it may no longer be feasible for the IRS to support any ￿ 2 [0;1] as
she would wish. Instead, we have ￿(￿) 2 [0;minf I
c(￿+1￿q);1g] at ￿ = ￿ ￿. In terms of the
graph, the height of the IRS￿ s best response curve at ￿ = ￿ ￿ may fall short of 1 as shown in
Figures 1a and 1b. Secondly, when ￿ > ￿ ￿, R(￿) > c will hold so that an incremental dollar
of audit input could return more than an incremental dollar of tax revenue. As a result,
the ￿pro￿t-maximizing￿IRS would audit for sure if there were no constraint on her budget.
That is, ￿(￿) = 1 would hold for all ￿ > ￿ ￿. This may no longer be true when the budget
constraint is imposed. Speci￿cally, a binding budget constraint will bring down the feasible
probability of audit that the IRS can support and, moreover, the larger the amount of evaders
(i.e. a higher ￿), the lower the probability of audit that these evaders will face (i.e. a lower
￿). This ￿congestion￿e⁄ect, which is emphasized by GRW0, is captured in our model by the
downward-sloping part of the IRS￿ s best response curve as ￿ > ￿ ￿.
10Note that ￿(￿) = I
c(￿+1￿q) for ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ if ￿(￿) ￿ 1. This explains the shape of the IRS￿ s
best-response curve as ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ in Figure 1 (i.e.
@￿(￿)
@￿ < 0 and
@2￿(￿)
@￿2 > 0). The intersection
of the dotted and the solid curve in Figure 1 pins down the equilibrium of the game. There
are three intersections in Figure 1b, while there is a single intersection in both Figures 1a
and 1c. The former intersections represent the three possible equilibria characterized in b) of
Proposition 1 (iii), while the latter intersection represents the unique equilibrium characterized
in a) and c) of Proposition 1 (iii), respectively. We shall have more to say on these equilibrium
outcomes later.
3.2 Discussion
This subsection discusses several issues related to Proposition 1.
3.2.1 Habitual complier
The original GRW model incorporates taxpayers who are inherently honest, in the sense
that they report their incomes truthfully regardless of the incentive to cheat. GRW call these
taxpayers ￿habitual compliers.￿ We brie￿ y discuss the e⁄ect of incorporating these taxpayers.
Suppose that ￿ (< q) taxpayers are inherently honest and always report y to the IRS.
Introducing these so-called ￿habitual compliers￿to the model reduces the portion of strategic
taxpayers who may cheat from q to q ￿￿. In terms of Figure 1, it merely replaces the origin
(0;0) with (￿;0) and ￿ ￿ with ￿ ￿ + ￿. As long as ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ q, everything else remains the same
and nothing essential changes with the incorporation.13
13If ￿ ￿ + ￿ > q, we would have ￿ ￿ > q ￿ ￿, which is infeasible since q ￿ ￿ is the maximal portion of cheaters
in the presence of ￿ habitual compliers. See footnote 21 for more comments on habitual compliers.
113.2.2 Budget surplus
The pro￿t-maxmizing objective function of the IRS follows GRW and is standard in the
tax evasion literature. GRW consider other possible IRS objective functions, but conclude
that the pro￿t-maximizing objective ￿adequately captures both the general and the speci￿c
deterrence objectives often attributed to IRS enforcement policy.￿(GRW, p. 29)
Sticking to the assumption that the IRS maximizes her ￿pro￿t,￿a budget surplus becomes
possible as long as the IRS is not budget constrained in equilibrium. For example, when the
equilibrium outcome (￿￿;￿￿) = (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) occurs, it is likely that the audit cost expended by the
IRS will be less than the budget size appropriated by the Congress (i.e. ￿ ￿(￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q)c < I).
This possiblity raises a subtle question which seemed to go unnoticed in the past, namely, how
the pro￿t-maximizing IRS would ￿deal with￿the budget surplus. Indeed, the situation of a
budget surplus will always result in GRW￿ s budget-unconstrained model. This is because the
budget size in the GRW model is large enough for the IRS to support ￿ = 1 for all ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, but
￿￿ = ￿ ￿ < 1 in equilibrium. We do not address the ￿budget surplus￿question directly in this
paper. Instead, we keep the basic framework of the GRW model and devise a simple scheme
to achieve two ends: (i) preserving the IRS objective of pro￿t maximization, and (ii) forcing
the IRS to conserve the use of the allocated budget and return the unused money back to the
Congress:
Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) argue that it is di¢ cult for a government to commit to
the allocation of aggregate audit costs or aggregate revenues collected, but it is reasonable to
assume that the government can make commitments based on these aggregate variables since
they are publicly available as part of the process of budgetary appropriations and reviews
of tax-collection agencies. In line with this argument, our scheme consists of two aggregate
variables: the total tax revenue collected (G ￿ (q￿￿)T +￿￿(T +F)) and the budget surplus
generated (B ￿ I ￿￿ (￿ + 1 ￿ q)c). The Congress uses the sum G+B to evaluate the IRS￿ s
performance (the larger the sum, the higher the score), or even o⁄ers a ￿xed fraction of the
12sum G + B to the IRS as her bonus.
If the IRS were to maximize G alone, she would exhaust all the budget with B = 0
even though an additional dollar of audit input could not return an additonal dollar of tax
revenue (i.e. R(￿) < c). On the other hand, if the IRS were to be motivated to maximize B
alone, she would simply do nothing and generate the budget surplus B = I, even though an
additional dollar of audit input could return more than an additional dollar of tax revenue (i.e.
R(￿) > c). Since the IRS is motivated to maximize the sum of G and B rather than either of
them alone, she needs to trade o⁄the loss of B against the gain in G when carrying out a tax
audit. If R(￿) > c, the loss of B through expended audit cost will be more than compensated
by the gain in G through collected tax revenue and, as a result, it will be worthwhile for the
IRS to carry out the tax audit. On the other hand, if R(￿) < c, the loss of B will not be
compensated by the gain in G and, therefore, it will be not worthwhile for the IRS to carry
out the tax audit. This trade-o⁄between G and B at the margin will drive the IRS to equate
R(￿) (the marginal revenue of tax collection) with c (the marginal cost of tax collection) as
far as possible and, at the same time, conserve the use of the allocated budget as much as
possible. In other words, the proposed scheme has achieved the two ends stated within our
framework.14
3.2.3 Comparison with GRW0
The de￿ning feature that distinguishes our model (with budget constraints) from the GRW
model (without budget constraints) is the presence of the congestion e⁄ect: holding the IRS￿ s
budget constant, the higher the incidence of evasion, the lower the audit probability that an
evader will face. This congestion e⁄ect is exhibited in our model through the modi￿cation of
14It must be admitted that many practical complications may arise if our scheme is put into e⁄ect in the
real world. Nevertheless, the scheme may still serve as a useful start for taking into consideration these
complications.
13the IRS￿ s best response in the GRW model. As to the taxpayers￿best response, it remains
the same as that in the GRW model (see our Figure 1).
GRW0 adopt a di⁄erent approach: the congestion e⁄ect is incorporated into their model
through the modi￿cation of the taxpayers￿rather than the IRS￿ s best response in the GRW
model. They explain their approach as follows (pp. 6-7):
￿In that model [the GRW model] no budget constraint is imposed on the IRS
so there is no direct interaction between the reporting strategies of the taxpayers
￿a Nash Equilibrium for the game can be characterized simply by considering
the interaction between the IRS and a representative taxpayer. However, once a
budget constraint is imposed on the IRS, the likelihood of audit facing one taxpayer
depends on the reporting strategy of the other taxpayers. Thus it becomes useful
to consider ￿rst the interaction between the taxpayers in selecting their reporting
strategies, taking the IRS audit strategy as given.￿
Note that the so-called ￿IRS audit strategy￿in the last sentence of the above quotation
cannot be the probability of audit that the taxpayers actually face (i.e. ￿ in our model).
Faced with a given ￿, a taxpayer will comply if ￿ > ￿ ￿ and will evade if ￿ < ￿ ￿. This is true
regardless of other taxpayers￿decisions. In other words, there would simply be no interaction
among the taxpayers, contrary to GRW0￿ s description.
The ￿IRS audit strategy￿in the GRW0 model means something else, which is called ￿the
probability of audit given exposure￿ by GRW0. As to ￿exposure,￿ it has to do with the
size of the IRS budget ￿the larger the budget, all else equal, the higher the probability of
exposure to an audit. The probability of audit that the taxpayers actually face in the GRW0
model is the product of two probabilities: the probability of exposure, and the probability
of audit given exposure. Given the IRS￿ s probability of audit given exposure, GRW0 derive
the so-called ￿taxpayer equilibrium￿(all the taxpayers make mutually best responses to each
14other). The full equilibrium of the game is then determined by putting together (i) the
taxpayer equilibrium, given the IRS￿ s probability of audit given exposure; and (ii) the IRS￿ s
best choice over the probability of audit given exposure, given the taxpayer equilibrium. It
turns out that the IRS￿ s best choice over the probability of audit given exposure coincides
with the IRS￿ s best response in the GRW model (see their Figure 2).
As might be glimpsed from what we have just described, the GRW0 way of deriving
equilibria is somewhat complicated. We believe our approach greatly simpli￿es the analysis.
In particular, note that while the taxpayers￿best response in the GRW model is replaced with
the ￿taxpayer equilibrium￿in GRW0, we avoid the step of deriving the ￿taxpayer equilibrium.￿
As in the GRW model, our equilibria are characterized simply by considering the interaction
between the IRS and a representative taxpayer.
4 E¢ ciency
In this section we turn our attention to evaluate and compare the degrees of e¢ ciency in tax
collection across di⁄erent equilibria as the budget size I varies, making an attempt to answer
the normative question: how much should we fund the IRS? Since variations in the budget I
exert no impact on ￿￿ = q if R(q) 2 [0;c] (Proposition 1 (i)-(ii)), our analysis is con￿ned to
the case where R(q) > c (Proposition 1 (iii)).
The e¢ ciency criterion we use for comparison is in terms of per dollar of tax collection.
Speci￿cally, we ￿rst add up (i) the full cost imposed on the taxpayers and (ii) the audit cost
expended by the IRS to arrive at a sum, and then divide the resulting sum by the total tax
revenue (including ￿nes) collected. The full cost to the taxpayers includes the tax and ￿ne
paid plus the excess burden imposed. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) emphasize that the tax
revenue collected from the taxpayers merely represents a transfer between the private and
the public sector and, therefore, it should not be counted as a cost to society. They employ
15the excess burden imposed on taxpayers plus the audit cost expended by the IRS as the cost
to society. Our e¢ ciency measure, which is de￿ned in terms of per dollar of tax collection,
is consistent with theirs. This is because both the numerator and the denominator of our
e¢ ciency measure have taken into account the tax revenue collected so that
(full cost imposed on taxpayers + audit cost expended by IRS}/total tax revenue collected
=1 + (excess burden imposed on taxpayers + audit cost expended by IRS)/total tax revenue
collected.
We will exploit some useful properties of the full cost imposed on the taxpayers when we
make comparison of e¢ ciency across di⁄erent equilibria.
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) subsume the IRS and the Congress under the rubric of a
single player called ￿government.￿ Through choosing both the probability of audit and the
tax rate, the society is constrained to raise a given amount of tax revenue in their model.
By contrast, the IRS and the Congress are two di⁄erent players in our model. Because the
tax structure is predetermined by the Congress and so is beyond the IRS￿ s control, the tax
revenue collected will as a rule be variable and not ￿xed. To facilitate the comparison across
di⁄erent equilibria, it is more convenient for us to de￿ne the e¢ ciency criterion in terms of
per dollar of tax collection.
Note that our per-tax-dollar criterion is consistent with the so-called ￿marginal cost of
public funds,￿ which is de￿ned as the full cost to society of transferring a dollar to the
government; see Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002). Since our comparison is across di⁄erent
equilibria, we employ the average- rather than marginal-cost criterion.
4.1 Cost of public funds
Following Cowell (1990), we de￿ne the ￿cost of evasion￿ as the monetary amount that a
taxpayer would just be prepared to pay in order to be guaranteed that he will get away with
16the tax evasion. It is an amount C such that
u(y ￿ C) = ￿u(y ￿ T ￿ F) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(y): (2)
The amount C can be decomposed into two components: the tax (including the ￿ne) that a
taxpayer expects to pay (r) and the risk premium that the taxpayer would be ready to pay
in order to eliminate the exposure to audit risk (￿). That is, C = r+￿, where r = ￿(T +F).
Note that ￿ > 0 as long as u00 < 0. Yitzhaki (1987) calls the risk premium ￿ the ￿excess
burden of tax evasion￿since it represents a deadweight loss beyond what would be imposed
on the taxpayer if the expected tax revenue r were somehow collected by a lump-sum tax.
The equality C = T will obviously hold if the taxpayer is indi⁄erent between evasion and
compliance. This then implies that T > ￿ ￿(T + F), since (i) C = ￿ ￿(T + F) + ￿ with ￿ > 0,
and (ii) ￿ ￿ is by de￿nition the probability of audit that makes the taxpayers indi⁄erent between
evasion and compliance. We call this ￿nding ￿Result 1￿and will exploit it later.
By the implicit function theorem, we have C as a function of ￿. Taking the total derivative
of equation (2) with respect to ￿ gives
u
0 (y ￿ C)(￿C￿) = u(y ￿ T ￿ F) ￿ u(y):
Hence,
C￿ =
u(y) ￿ u(y ￿ T ￿ F)




[u(y) ￿ u(y ￿ T ￿ F)]u00(y ￿ C (￿))C￿
[u0 (y ￿ C)]2 < 0: (4)
That is, C(￿) is a strictly increasing and concave function. We call this ￿nding ￿Result 2￿
and will also exploit it later.
Let I￿ denote the amount of audit cost expended by the IRS in an equilibrium. By our
assumption that the IRS is not allowed to use the taxes or ￿nes collected to ￿nance her own
audit cost, we have I￿ ￿ I. Under an equilibrium outcome (￿￿;￿￿), the total cost paid by the
17taxpayers and the Congress equals S (￿￿;￿￿;I￿) ￿ qC (￿￿)+I￿, while the corresponding total
tax revenue collected by the IRS equals G(￿￿;￿￿;I￿) ￿ (q ￿ ￿￿)T + ￿￿￿￿(T + F). Thus,
our e¢ ciency measure is   (￿￿;￿￿;I￿) ￿
S(￿￿;￿￿;I￿)
G(￿￿;￿￿;I￿). Note that if ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ or ￿￿ = ^ ￿, we can
replace T with C in S. The reason for this is that when ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ or ￿￿ = ^ ￿, some taxpayers
will evade while others will not. All these taxpayers must be indi⁄erent between evasion and
compliance and, therefore, we have C = T.
Let ￿ I ￿ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q)c, which is the minimal size of the budget that is capable of sup-
porting (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) (see Proposition 1 (iii)). Table 1 summarizes the total cost S and the tax
revenue collected G as the equilibrium outcome (￿￿;￿￿) varies with I. Note that both S
and G remain the same for all I ￿ ￿ I if (￿￿;￿￿) = (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿), and thus  
￿




￿ ￿; ￿ ￿; ￿ I
￿
if
I ￿ ￿ I. This result is due to our scheme of forcing the IRS to conserve the use of the allocated
budget and return the unused money back to the Congress.
Table 1.
IRS￿ s budget I (￿￿;￿￿) Total cost S Tax collected G
















I 2 [￿ I; ￿ ￿c]
￿





+ I (q ￿ ^ ￿)T + ^ ￿￿ ￿(T + F)
(￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) qC
￿￿ ￿
￿
+ ￿ I (q ￿ ￿ ￿)T + ￿ ￿￿ ￿(T + F)
I > ￿ ￿c (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) qC
￿￿ ￿
￿
+ ￿ I (q ￿ ￿ ￿)T + ￿ ￿￿ ￿(T + F)
The following proposition shows that (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) yields the lowest   among all possible equi-
librium outcomes.
Proposition 2 Of all possible equilibrium outcomes, (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) yields the least cost per dollar of
tax collection.
Figure 2 depicts our e¢ ciency measure   against the allocated budget I.15 The value of
15Except for   =  (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿; ￿ I), the line segment associated with   =  (q; I
c;I) or   =  (^ ￿; ￿ ￿;I) need not be






is strictly decreasing in I until I = ￿ ￿c (see the proof of Proposition 2). Beyond
￿ ￿c, (￿￿;￿￿) = (q; I
c) will no longer exist (see Table 1). The value of  
￿
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if I approaches ￿ ￿c. Indeed,
￿
^ ￿; ￿ ￿
￿





if I = ￿ ￿c (see Remark
1). As to  
￿
￿ ￿; ￿ ￿;I
￿
, it remains constant with respect to I. It is clear from Figure 2 that
(￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) yields the least cost per dollar of tax collection among all possible equilibrium outcomes.
Note that ￿ ￿ is the smallest equilibrium evasion possible within our model.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3 about here]
Suppose that (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) is not the equilibrium outcome at the status quo. If we pour more
resources into the IRS, the IRS￿ s best-response curve will be shifted upward as shown in
Figure 3. If we keep on pouring, it is clear that (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿), similar to that shown in Figure 1c,
will eventually result as the unique equilibrium outcome. In contrast to outcomes
￿
^ ￿; ￿ ￿
￿
and (q; I
c) where the marginal tax revenue is greater than the marginal cost of collection (i.e.
R(^ ￿) > c and R(q) > c), the IRS equates the marginal tax revenue to the marginal cost of
collection under the outcome (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) (i.e. R(￿ ￿) = c). Since outcome (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) yields the least
cost per dollar of tax collection, we obtain
Corollary 1 The size of the budget allocated to the IRS should be expanded as long as an
additional dollar allocated could return more than an additional dollar of tax revenue.
A tax farmer, who is interested only in pro￿t maximization, will expand the size of her
audit resources if an additional dollar of audit input could return more than an additional
dollar of tax revenue. Corollary 1 requires that the Congress support the ￿IRS as tax
farmer.￿ 16 This policy prescription contrasts with Slemrod and Yitzhaki￿ s (1987) ￿nding
that the marginal tax revenue exceeds the marginal cost of collection at the optimum and,
16Should the IRS be simply privatized? Answering this question would take us beyond the scope of the
present paper. Some would argue that collection costs tend to be lower for private than public agents
19consequently, the ￿IRS as tax farmer￿would lead to a socially excessive amount of resources
devoted to tax collection. Put di⁄erently, the Congress should provide a smaller budget than
the IRS would wish according to Slemrod and Yitzhaki, whereas the Congress should provide
the budget that the IRS would wish according to our model.
To ensure that (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) is the unique equilibrium outcome, I > ￿ ￿c must hold (see Table 1).
Since the size of the population who report nothing equals (￿￿ + 1 ￿ q) in equilibrium and
since the IRS incurs a cost c for each person it veri￿es, the meaning of the inequality I > ￿ ￿c
is clear: even if ￿￿ = q (i.e. all taxpayers evade) so that ￿￿ + 1 ￿ q = 1, the size of the
budget allocated should still enable the IRS to support an audit probability higher than ￿ ￿
(i.e. I
c(￿￿+1￿q) = I
c > ￿ ￿). The intuition behind this result is simple. Note that the taxpayers
will comply if they expect ￿ > ￿ ￿. When I > ￿ ￿c, it is feasible for the IRS to support
an audit probability higher than ￿ ￿ at all possible realized ￿￿ s: This feasibility completely
eliminates the taxpayers￿self-ful￿lling expectations that a widespread and rampant evasion
may ￿congest￿the IRS￿ s tax administration to such an extent that it becomes impossible
for the IRS to maintain ￿ > ￿ ￿ at some high ￿￿ s. By contrast, the taxpayers￿self-ful￿lling
expectations could support the realization of ￿￿ = ^ ￿ or ￿￿ = q if I ￿ ￿ ￿c.17
(Toma and Toma, 1992). However, one might worry about whether taxpayers￿private information should be
possessed by private agents. Through H.R. 4520, American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, the Congress gives
the IRS the authority to use private collection agencies to collect IRS debt and pay them a bounty of up
to 25 percent of the money they collect. This statute is strongly opposed by National Treasury Employees
Union. One reason raised for the opposition is: ￿the IRS does not have the technology in place to ensure that
taxpayer information is kept secure and con￿dential when it is handed over to the private collection agencies.￿
(Kelley, 2005)
17At ￿￿ = q, the maximal probability of audit that the IRS can support equals I
c. If I
c is greater than ￿ ￿,
the equilibrium (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) can be ensured. If I
c is not greater than ￿ ￿, the equilibrium (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) cannot be ensured.
We focus on lifting I
c above ￿ ￿ by increasing I. There is another side of the same coin: lifting I
c above ￿ ￿ by
reducing c. We comment on this alternative possibility at the end of the paper.
204.2 Intuition
As noted before, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) and others, including Usher (1986), Kaplow
(1990), Mayshar (1991) and Sanchez and Sobel (1993), all conclude that the size of the budget
allocated to the IRS should fall short of equating the marginal revenue with the marginal cost
of tax collection, whereas we conclude that it should equate the marginal revenue with the
marginal cost of tax collection. Is there any intuition behind the di⁄erence? In this subsection
we provide one.
Mayshar (1991) views the maximal tax revenue collected as a function of the IRS￿ s en-
forcement budget and other variables such as the tax base and tax structure. He calls this
function a ￿tax technology.￿ Like the standard production function of the ￿rm, the tax
technology is a ￿black box￿and its details are left unspeci￿ed. Because of the ￿black box￿
nature, Mayshar￿ s tax technology can be interpreted to accommodate a variety of models,
including Slemrod and and Yitzhaki￿ s commitment model and our non-commitment model.
Speci￿cally, in terms of our notation, we can simply write G = G(I), where G(:) represents
the tax technology. The net tax revenue or ￿pro￿t￿is then represented by G(I) ￿ I.
What does G(I)￿I look like? Mayshar (1991) argues that it takes the shape of a La⁄er
curve as shown in Figure 4-1.18 This shape seems to be typical for a pro￿t function. Let
us impose the set of indi⁄erence curves of a social welfare function W(I;G￿I) with @W
@I < 0
and @W
@(G￿I) > 0 on the ￿La⁄er curve.￿ It is easy to see from Figure 4-1 that the optimal level
of I is always lower than the level selected by the ￿pro￿t-maximizing￿IRS.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Figure 4-2 shows the shape of G(I) ￿ I in our model.19 The ￿pro￿t￿G(I) ￿ I increases
with I continuously until the level of I reaches ￿ I. From ￿ I on, G(I) ￿ I takes a zigzag shape
18See Figure 1 in Mayshar (1991).
19The shape of G(I) ￿ I in Figure 4-2 can be derived directly from Table 1.
21rather than the standard shape of a La⁄er curve and, in particular, the value of G(I) ￿ I
may jump discontinuously as I varies. The reason for the discontinuous jump in ￿pro￿t￿is
obviously attributable to the existence of multiple equilibria, which are in turn attributable
to the mitigation (if ￿￿ = ^ ￿ rather than ￿￿ = q) or even elimination (if ￿￿ = ￿ ￿ rather
than ￿￿ = q) of the congestion e⁄ect.20 This mitigation or elimination of the congestion
e⁄ect becomes feasible only if the size of the budget allocated to the IRS is large enough to
satisfy I ￿ ￿ I. Let us impose the same set of indi⁄ernce curves of the social welfare function
W(I;G ￿ I) on the ￿zigzag curve.￿ It is easy to see from Figure 4-2 that the equilibrium
outcome (￿￿;￿￿) = (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) with I = ￿ I is the optimal solution. As we have explained in
Figure 3, this optimal solution can be implemented by supporting the ￿IRS as tax farmer￿
and expanding the size of the budget allocated to the IRS as long as the marginal revenue is
greater than the marginal cost of tax collection.
5 Extension
The model presented so far may well represent a particular audit class only, where the audit
class is sorted on the basis of some observable taxpayer characteristics such as zip code,
reported income level/source, occupation or age. GRW and Erard and Feinstein (1994),
among others, interpret their audit rules within, not across, audit classes. The same kind of
interpretation is equally applicable to our previous setting. In this section we consider an
economy-wide model in which there are two or more audit classes.
Consider an economy in which there are n ￿ 2 audit classes. Except for the audit cost,
each audit class has identical structures and parameters as before. Without loss of generality,
let 0 < c1 < c2 < ￿￿￿ < cn. We could consider a more general setting in which incomes earned
20Remember that the congestion e⁄ect is captured in our model by the downward-sloping part of the IRS￿ s
best response curve as ￿ > ￿ ￿.
22vary across di⁄erent audit classes. Speci￿cally, let i and j denote two di⁄erent audit classes,
and Ti < Tj and Fi < Fj if yi < yj (i.e. the higher the income earned in an audit class, the
more the tax that needs to be paid and the larger the ￿ne that needs to be imposed if evasion
is detected). However, Proposition 1 reveals that what matters to our model is the relative
rather than absolute relation between T + F and c (i.e. R(q) = q(T + F) relative to c). In
view of this, we let yi = yj and focus on the case where ci 6= cj for simplicity.21
If R(q) ￿ ci, it is not pro￿table for the IRS to audit class i. We then have the same result
as Proposition 1 (i)-(ii), that is, ￿￿
i = q and variations in I exert no impact on ￿￿
i. Similar
to Proposition 2, we con￿ne our analysis to the cases where R(q) > ci.
Now suppose that R(q) > cn. De￿ne ￿ ￿i as the amount of ￿i such that the IRS is merely
indi⁄erent between auditing and not auditing class i (i.e. R(￿ ￿i) = ci). Let Ii ￿ 0 be the
IRS￿ s budget allocation intended for auditing class i with
Pn
i=1 Ii = I. We have the following
extension of Proposition 2.22
Proposition 3 Of all possible equilibrium outcomes, f
￿
￿ ￿i; ￿ ￿
￿
gn
i=1 yields the least cost per
21Reinganum and Wilde (1986) extend the GRW model (without habitual compliers) to the situation where
a taxpayer￿ s income can take any value in some range. They focus on the fully separating equilibrium. As
Erard and Feinstein (1994) point out, an unrealistic feature of this separating solution is that the IRS knows
the true income of each taxpayer prior to performing any tax audit, even though in actual practice this is
often not the case. Erard and Feinstein (1994) incorporate habitual compliers into the Reinganum-Wilde
model, showing that the incorporation has important impacts on the equilibrium solution and, in particular,
that it resolves the unrealistic feature mentioned above. The cost paid is that the resulting equilibrium is
characterized by a highly nonlinear second-order di⁄erential equation, and Erard and Feinstein have to rely
extensively on simulations to study the solution of their model. It should be noted that Erard and Feinstein
(1994) do take into account the IRS￿ s budget constraint. However, there are no multiple equilibria associated
with the congestion e⁄ect in their model. Like GRW0, Erard and Feinstein (1994) do not address the e¢ ciency
issue.
22The budget allocation fI1;I2;:::;Ing that supports the outcome (￿ ￿i; ￿ ￿) (i = 1;2;:::;n) is not unique.
Therefore, we state f(￿ ￿i; ￿ ￿)gn
i=1 instead of f(￿ ￿i; ￿ ￿;Ii)gn
i=1 in Proposition 3.
23dollar of tax collection.
When there is only one audit class, I > ￿ ￿c must hold in order to ensure the least cost
equilibrium outcome (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) (see Table 1). What is the corresponding condition when there
are two or more audit classes? The following proposition provides the answer.
Proposition 4 To support f
￿
￿ ￿i; ￿ ￿
￿
gn
i=1 as the unique equilibrium outcome of the game, I >
[cn +
Pn￿1
















Remark 3 Melumad and Mookherjee (1989) argue that it is di¢ cult for a government to
commit to the allocation of aggregate audit costs or aggregate revenues collected, but it is
reasonable to assume that the government can make commitments based on these aggregate
variables since they are publicly available as part of the process of budgetary appropriations
and reviews of tax-collection agencies. Our setting is consistent with this argument since the
Congress can control I, but not Ii.
Remark 4 Erard and Ho (2004) use information from two data ￿les of the IRS￿ s Taxpayer
Compliance Measurement Program for the tax year 1988 (one for those who ￿le tax returns
and the other for those who do not ￿le tax returns) plus supplementary information on tip
earners and informal suppliers to study the tax compliance behavior of 34 distinct occupational
groups in the U.S. economy. They ￿nd that the share of tax liability that goes unpaid is 14.9%
on average for all occupations as a whole, but that it varies substantially across di⁄erent occu-
pations, ranging from 51.1% (vehicle sales), 49.8% (tip earners), 44.1% (informal suppliers),
16.0% (mechanics and repairers), and 7.0% (doctors and dentists), to 5.4% (accountants, au-






cj for i 6= j, @R
@￿ > 0 and 0 < c1 < c2 < ￿￿￿ < cn,
it is clear that ￿￿
1 < ￿￿
2 < ::: < ￿￿
n ￿ q must hold in our extended model. Supposing that
24audit classes are sorted on the basis of occupations, this result is consistent with Erard and
Ho￿ s ￿nding with regard to the U.S. tax compliance continuum across occupations.
The intuition underlying Proposition 4 is as follows. First, it is not possible to have
￿￿
i = ￿￿




cj (the IRS can then improve her
pro￿t by re-allocating the budget between audit classes i and j). Thus, in any equilibrium
there is at most one audit class such that all taxpayers cheat. Furthermore, this audit class
must be the nth class because ￿￿
1 < ￿￿
2 < ::: < ￿￿
n ￿ q and the corresponding equilibrium must
satisfy equation (5). The inequality condition stated in Proposition 4 essentially requires that
the total budget allocated to the IRS be large enough for her to kill o⁄ this equilibrium. In
Table 1, (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) is the only equilibrium outcome that will survive once the budget size is large
enough to eradicate the most ￿congestive￿equilibrium evasion (i.e. ￿￿ = q). Analogously,
in our extended model, f
￿
￿ ￿i; ￿ ￿
￿
gn
i=1 is the only equilibrium outcome that will survive once
the budget size is large enough to eradicate the most ￿congestive￿equilibrium evasion (i.e.
￿￿
i = ~ ￿i for i = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1 and ￿￿
n = q).
6 Conclusion
We conclude our paper with four remarks. First, suppose that the audit classes in Section
5 are sorted on the basis of occupations. We can then extend our model to incorporate
the taxpayers￿occupational choice before the Congress￿ s budget allocation.23 As long as
the size of the budget allocated is large enough to support the least cost equilibrium as the
unique outcome, the IRS￿ s auditing activities will not distort the taxpayers￿occupational
choice. This is because the equality ￿ ￿iu(y ￿ T ￿ F) +
￿
1 ￿ ￿ ￿i
￿
u(y) = u(y ￿ T) holds for
23One can reverse the order of the choices: adding the taxpayers￿occupational choice after the Congress￿ s
budget allocation. However, it seems that the occupational choice is a longer decision than the yearly budget
allocation.
25all i = 1;2;:::;n at the least cost equilibrium. That is, all taxpayers in all occupations
are indi⁄erent between evasion and compliance. This equality also indicates that horizontal
equity in the ex ante sense will be obeyed. Other equilibria need not possess such desirable
properties. For example, consider the equilibrium that satis￿es equation (5). The outcome
resulting from this equilibrium not only distorts the taxpayers￿occupational choice but also
violates horizontal equity. This is because the taxpayers in the nth audit class enjoy a higher
expected utility than the taxpayers in other audit classes.
Second, Kau and Rubin (1981, p. 262) hypothesize that ￿there have been changes in pro-
duction technologies which have directly led to an increase in the proportion of income which
is subject to taxation.￿ These changes are attributable to factors such as fewer self-employed
individuals, improved record keeping due to increased incorporation, and the substitution of
market production for home production. All of these changes presumably lower the IRS￿ s
cost of tax audits. North (1985, p. 392) puts forth a similar hypothesis: ￿The supply of
government was made possible by new technology which, coupled with the consequences of
growing market specialization, lowered the costs of government monitoring of income and
wealth and increased the e¢ ciency of government taxation.￿ Kau and Rubin (1981) ￿nd em-
pirical support for their hypothesis, and Ferris and West (1996) provide additional empirical
support. In terms of our model, a lower cost of tax audit has three main e⁄ects: (i) it turns
some taxpayers from being ￿hard-to-tax￿into ￿not-so-hard-to-tax￿(i.e. from R(q) ￿ c to
R(q) > c in Proposition 1), (ii) it lowers the threshold evasion that makes the IRS indi⁄erent
between auditing and not auditing (i.e. a lower ￿ ￿ de￿ned in equation (1)), and (iii) it raises
the probability of audit that the IRS can support under a budget constraint (i.e. a higher
I
c(￿+1￿q)). These e⁄ects are obviously important and should not be ignored. Nevertheless, as
far as the yearly budget appropriation is concerned, it does not seem unreasonable to view the
audit cost c as a parameter, which is beyond the control of both the IRS and the Congress.24
24The IRS is modernizing its forty-year-old information system through the Business Systems Modernization
26Third, according to our model, the IRS will let go of ￿hard-to-tax￿taxpayers. Increasing
the size of the budget allocated to the IRS can do little about it. This result is attributed to
the fact that there is a negative return on money invested in ￿hard-to-tax￿taxpayers for the
IRS. Wertz (1979) observes that the IRS is often expected by the Congress to ￿show a pro￿t￿
on her enforcement activities. This could aggravate the ￿hard-to-tax￿problem. Fixing the
￿hard-to-tax￿is a thorny task and alternative strategies such as exempting these taxpayers
or simply ignoring them have been proposed. We refer those who are interested in the issue
to Alm et al (2004).
Fourth, we provide a case for the policy prescription that the size of the budget allocated to
the IRS should be expanded as long as an additional dollar allocated could return more than
an additional dollar of tax revenue (Corollary 1). Of course, like ￿ndings in other theoretical
models, this result is built upon several assumptions which abstract a parsimonious model
from the complicated real world. An assumption of the GRW model, on which our model
is based, is that individual incomes take one of only two values (either high or low). This
assumption may be restrictive in that it reduces the taxpayer problem to a simple comply/do
not comply decision.25 Other assumptions such as that true income will be discovered once
a tax audit is performed, and that taxpayers su⁄er no additional cost during the auditing
process may be problematic as well. It is arguable that the tax code itself is imperfect
and that tax auditors are not uniform in interpreting the tax code. As a result, the so-
called ￿true income￿ may never be known. ￿Mention the IRS, most people think of the
dreaded tax audit.￿ This vivid description of the IRS￿ s tax audit by Slemrod and Bakija
program. The implementation of this program is expected to reduce the IRS￿ s audit cost in the future; see
IRS Oversight Board (2006).
25Two points are worth mentioning, however. First, as noted in footnote 5, there are two possible interpre-
tations for non-compliance in our model: underreporting and non-￿ling. Whether or not to ￿le tax returns is
by nature a binary comply/do not comply decision. Second, we have extended the GRW model to multiple
audit classes in Section 5.
27(2004, p. 180) suggests that the auditing process itself may be highly costly to taxpayers.
Note also that ￿ling tax returns per se is assumed costless for individuals in our model.
This seems inconsistent with the substantial e⁄orts exerted by the IRS to provide the so-
called ￿taxpayer service.￿ Indeed, according to Professor Slemrod￿ s (2005) testimony to the
President￿ s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, complying with the tax code per se costs
individual taxpayers approximately $85 billion a year. Despite these and other possible
limitations of our model, we believe we have brought a fresh perspective to the important
issue of how much to fund the IRS. Kaplow (1996, p. 144) wrote:
￿In the academic literature, it is well understood (although not always re-
membered or emphasized) that the proper cost-bene￿t analysis does not simply
compare the enforcement cost to the revenue raised.￿
This claim may need to be quali￿ed based on the thrust of this paper.
7 Appendix
Proposition 1.
Proof. (i) If R(q) 2 [0;c), the IRS￿ s incremental expected revenue from a tax audit will
always be less than her audit cost spent, regardless of what ￿ is. Hence, the IRS never audits,
that is ￿￿ = 0. Since the IRS never audits, the taxpayer has no incentive to report y and, as
a result, ￿￿ = q.
(ii) Suppose that R(q) = c. If ￿￿ < q, the IRS has no incentive to audit since R(￿) < c
for all ￿ < q. This implies that ￿ (￿￿) = 0. However, with ￿ (￿￿) = 0 < ￿ ￿, every taxpayer
would strictly prefer cheating, that is, ￿￿ = q, which yields a contradiction. This leaves us
only the case of ￿￿ = q . Given R(q) = c, the IRS is indi⁄erent between auditing and not
auditing, that is, ￿ (q) 2 [0;minfI
c;1g]. However, for all taxpayers to choose cheating, we
require that ￿(q) ￿ ￿ ￿. Hence, we obtain ￿￿ 2 [0;minfI
c; ￿ ￿g].
28(iii) Suppose that R(q) > c. Since R(0) = 0 and @R
@￿ > 0, we have a unique ￿ 2 (0;q)
such that R(￿) = c. This unique ￿ is the ￿ ￿ de￿ned in (1). Note that the sign of R(￿)￿c is
the same as the sign of ￿￿ ￿ ￿. The IRS￿ s best audit response to ￿ with the budget constraint
is thus given by
￿ (￿) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
minf I
c(￿+1￿q);1g if ￿ > ￿ ￿
2 [0;minf I
c(￿ ￿+1￿q);1g] if ￿ = ￿ ￿
0 if ￿ < ￿ ￿
where ￿ > ￿ ￿ implies R(￿) > c so that the IRS will either exhaust all her budget with
￿ (￿) = I
c(￿+1￿q) or reach ￿(￿) = 1; ￿ < ￿ ￿ implies R(￿) < c so that it is not pro￿table for
the IRS to carry out any tax audit with ￿ (￿) = 0; and ￿ = ￿ ￿ implies R(￿) = c so that the
IRS is indi⁄erent between auditing and not auditing.
A taxpayer￿ s best response will depend on his expectation concerning ￿. If he expects
￿ > ￿ ￿, he will report y . If ￿ < ￿ ￿, he will report nothing. If ￿ = ￿ ￿, he is indi⁄erent.
Suppose ￿￿ < ￿ ￿, then ￿(￿￿) = 0, which implies that every taxpayer strictly prefers
cheating, that is, ￿￿ = q > ￿ ￿, a contradiction.
Suppose ￿￿ = ￿ ￿; then ￿ (￿￿ = ￿ ￿) 2 [0;minf I
c(￿ ￿+1￿q);1g]. Since ￿ ￿ 2 (0;q), it is required
that a taxpayer be indi⁄erent between reporting y and reporting nothing. Because ￿ ￿ is the
audit probability that makes the taxpayer indi⁄erent between reporting and not reporting, the
only equilibrium in this case is ￿(￿￿ = ￿ ￿) = ￿ ￿. Note that ￿ (￿￿ = ￿ ￿) 2 [0;minf I
c(￿ ￿+1￿q);1g].
Therefore, I
c(￿ ￿+1￿q) ￿ ￿ ￿ or, equivalently, I ￿ ￿ ￿ c(￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q).
Suppose ￿￿ 2 (￿ ￿;q), then ￿ (￿￿) = minf I
c(￿￿+1￿q);1g. To support ￿￿ 2 (￿ ￿;q), which
implies that a taxpayer is indi⁄erent between reporting y and not reporting, we need ￿ (￿￿) =
I
c(￿￿+1￿q) = ￿ ￿; that is, ￿￿ = ^ ￿ and ￿￿ = ￿ ￿. Since ^ ￿ 2 (￿ ￿;q), we have I = ￿ ￿c(^ ￿ + 1 ￿ q) 2
(￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q)c; ￿ ￿c).
Suppose ￿￿ = q, then ￿ (￿￿) = minf I
c(q+1￿q);1g = minfI
c;1g. To support ￿￿ = q, which
implies that a taxpayer prefers cheating, it is required that ￿ (￿￿ = q) = I
c ￿ ￿ ￿. Hence, we
29obtain I ￿ c￿ ￿.
To sum up, (￿￿;￿￿) = (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) could result if I ￿ ￿ ￿c(￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q); (￿￿;￿￿) =
￿
^ ￿; ￿ ￿
￿
could
result if ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q)c < I < ￿ ￿c; and (￿￿;￿￿) = (q; I
c) could result if I ￿ ￿ ￿c.
Proposition 2.
Proof. First, consider the comparison between
￿
￿ ￿; ￿ ￿
￿
and (^ ￿; ￿ ￿) when ^ ￿ 6= ￿ ￿. We know that
^ ￿ > ￿ ￿ and that T > ￿ ￿(T + F) (Result 1). Invoking these two results, it is straightforward
to see from Table 1 that G
￿




￿ ￿; ￿ ￿;I
￿
. Since ￿ I < I if ^ ￿ 6= ￿ ￿, we also see from
Table 1 that S
￿




￿ ￿; ￿ ￿; ￿ I
￿
. Putting these together yields  
￿




^ ￿; ￿ ￿;I
￿
.
That is, outcome (^ ￿; ￿ ￿) always yields a higher cost per dollar of tax collection than outcome
(￿ ￿; ￿ ￿) if ^ ￿ 6= ￿ ￿.
Next, consider the comparison between
￿







. We will ￿rst show that  (q; I
c;I)
is strictly decreasing in I. Since  
￿
￿ ￿; ￿ ￿; ￿ I
￿
is a constant, all we are left to show is that
 (q; I
c;I) remains higher than  (￿ ￿; ￿ ￿; ￿ I) at I = ￿ ￿c, the maximal size of the budget beyond
which the equilibrium with outcome (q; I
c) will no longer exist (see Proposition 1 (iii)).
From (3) and (4), we see that C is strictly increasing and concave in ￿ (Result 2). There-
fore, for any ￿ 2 (0;1) and x > 0, we have ￿C (x) + (1 ￿ ￿)C (0) < C (￿ ￿ x + (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ 0).
This leads to ￿C (x) < C (￿x), since C (0) = 0 by the de￿nition of C in equation (2). Now,
for any I < I0, choosing ￿ = I


















































This proves that  (q; I
c;I) is strictly decreasing in I.
At I = ￿ ￿c, we have (q; I
c) =
￿










= G(^ ￿; ￿ ￿;I) = (q ￿ ^ ￿)T + ^ ￿￿ ￿(T + F)
< (q ￿ ￿ ￿)T + ￿ ￿￿ ￿(T + F) = G
￿
￿ ￿; ￿ ￿; ￿ I
￿
:











) + I = qC
￿￿ ￿
￿
+ ￿ ￿c > qC
￿￿ ￿
￿
+ ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ + 1 ￿ q)c
= S
￿



















￿ ￿; ￿ ￿; ￿ I
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at I = ￿ ￿c.






























where the last inequality has utilized the property that   is decreasing in I. This means that







Proof. First, if there exists an i such that ￿￿
i < ￿ ￿i, then from the de￿nition of ￿ ￿i and because
@R
@￿ > 0, we know that R(￿￿
i) < ci and hence the IRS will choose ￿￿
i = 0. This implies that
the taxpayers will all cheat, i.e., ￿￿
i = q, a contradiction. Hence, we must have ￿￿
i ￿ ￿ ￿i for all
i. Next, we can check that if f(￿￿
i;￿￿
i )gn
i=1 is an equilibrium outcome, then either ￿￿
i 2 [￿ ￿i;q)
and ￿￿
i = ￿ ￿, or ￿￿
i = q and ￿￿
i =
Ii
ci ￿ ￿ ￿. Putting these together, we conclude that the
resulting equilibrium outcomes in an audit class qualitatively follow that of Proposition 1
(iii). Finally, viewing the role of Ii intended for audit class i as that of I in the case of one
audit class, the rest of the proof then follows the same logic as the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 4.
Proof. First, note that R(￿i) =
￿i
￿i￿1￿q(T + F) is strictly increasing and continuous in ￿i.
Since
R(￿ ￿i)




cn > 1 (i = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1), from the intermediate value theorem
we know that there exist ~ ￿i 2 (￿ ￿i;q) (i = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1) that satisfy (5).
31Step 1. Suppose that I ￿ [cn +
Pn￿1
i=1 (~ ￿i + 1 ￿ q)ci]￿ ￿. It is straightforward to check
that there exists an equilibrium outcome f(￿￿
i;￿￿
i )gn
i=1 such that (￿￿
i;￿￿
i ) = (~ ￿i; ￿ ￿) for i =







, where In = I ￿
Pn￿1
i=1 (~ ￿i + 1 ￿ q)ci￿ ￿. First, given
￿￿
i = ~ ￿i (i = 1;2;:::;n￿1) and ￿￿
n = q, we see from equation (5) that the incremental revenue
per dollar of tax audit is the same across all classes. This implies that the IRS cannot
improve her pro￿t by re-allocating the budget between di⁄erent audit classes and changing
￿i. Next, given ￿￿
i = ￿ ￿i (1;2;:::;n ￿ 1) and ￿￿
n = In
cn, we see that ￿￿
i = ~ ￿i (i = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1)
is consistent with ￿￿
i = ￿ ￿i = ￿ ￿ (i = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1) and that ￿￿
n = q is consistent with
￿￿
n = In
cn ￿ ￿ ￿ (Since I ￿ [cn +
Pn￿1
i=1 (~ ￿i + 1 ￿ q)ci]￿ ￿ by assumption, we obtain In ￿ cn￿ ￿ from
In = I ￿
Pn￿1
i=1 (~ ￿i + 1 ￿ q)ci￿ ￿).
Step 2. Suppose that I > [cn+
Pn￿1






￿ ￿i; ￿ ￿
￿
gn
i=1, that is, f
￿
￿ ￿i; ￿ ￿
￿
gn




ci must equal a constant for all i = 1;2;:::;n. Suppose not, and let i0 be the











ci0 > ￿ ￿ ( I
ci0 ￿ I
cn > ￿ ￿ +
Pn￿1
i=1 (~ ￿i + 1 ￿ q)
ci
cn
￿ ￿), we have ￿￿
i0 > ￿ ￿, which
leads to ￿￿







ci ￿ 0 for all i = 1;:::;n, which










ci = 1 must hold for all i = 1;:::;n. Suppose not. If
R(￿￿
i)
ci < 1, the
IRS would have no incentive to audit and so ￿￿
i = 0. This leads to ￿￿




cn > 1, a contradiction. If
R(￿￿
i)
ci > 1, the pro￿t-maxmizing IRS will exhaust the
budget intended for each audit class. Since ci is strictly increasing in i, ￿￿
i must be strictly
increasing in i in order to have a constant
R(￿￿
i)
ci for all i. Because of ￿￿
1 < ￿￿





i=1 that generates the same incremental revenue per dollar of tax audit is that
￿￿
i = ~ ￿i for i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1 and ￿￿
n = q. This implies that ￿￿
i ￿ ~ ￿i < q for i = 1;:::;n ￿ 1,
which in turn implies that ￿￿
i ￿ ￿ ￿ (i = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1). Putting ￿￿
i ￿ ~ ￿i and ￿￿
i ￿ ￿ ￿
32(i = 1;2;:::;n ￿ 1) together yields





i + 1 ￿ q)￿
￿
i ci > I ￿
n￿1 X
i=1
(~ ￿i + 1 ￿ q) ￿ ￿ci > ￿ ￿cn
where the ￿rst equality has utilized the result that the IRS will exhaust the budget intended for
each class and the last inequality comes from our premise. Therefore, we have ￿￿
n = In
cn > ￿ ￿,
which leads to ￿￿




ci = 1 for all i = 1;:::;n, we have ￿￿
i = ￿ ￿i (i = 1;:::;n). To support ￿￿
i 2 (0;q)
such that the taxpayers are indi⁄erent between auditing and not auditing, ￿￿
i = ￿ ￿ must be
true.
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Figure 2    ψ against I
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Figure  3  Shift  of ) (α β due to an increase in I 
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